Two Trains, Two Directions, One Line of Track – It Still Happens
It sounds like something from an overblown Hollywood blockbuster, two trains hurtling towards each other on one line of track, but this is a scenario that still, occasionally, plays out in real life. Over dramatic? Perhaps. But the risk in such a situation occurring is obvious and the cost, in human and financial terms, is potentially vast.
On 28 August 2019 this scenario was played out. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) reported an incident at Romney Sands, in Kent, during which two trains were erroneously authorised to use the same single line, despite travelling in opposite directions. The driver of one of the trains realised there was another train coming towards theirs just after leaving Romney Sands station. Their emergency stop message was heard by the other driver via their communication system and the two trains came to a halt 316 metres apart. You can read the full incident report on the RAIB site here.
Effective Systems Reduce Risk
Whilst no one was hurt during the incident, it does highlight the inherent danger in human error. The RAIB notes that the incident shows the importance of, “having systems and processes in place which can provide additional safeguards when safe operations otherwise rely on the actions of people.”
Running on a ticket and tablet system, the single stretch of rail requires a train driver to be in possession of the tablet for that single line of rail. Upon arrival at the next stop, they hand it over to the stationmaster so it can be passed to the next driver. Where two trains are travelling in the same direction on that stretch, the stationmaster can issue a ticket in lieu of the tablet for the train to safely pass.
This incident at Romney Sands occurred because of under-trained staff and confusion brought about by changes to the timetable which perhaps were not communicated as clearly as they could have been. It is strikingly obvious that utilising modern technology solutions would have avoided this incident.
Outdated Methods
So, can train operators afford to continue with such outdated methods, allowing the threat of human error to jeopardise not only the smooth running of their services, but also the lives of their staff and passengers? Nothing serious happened on this occasion, but it’s too close a call to be deemed acceptable.
In its notes, the RAIB offers ‘previous similar occurrences’ to compare an incident to.
Near Abermule, Montgomeryshire (now Powys) on 26 January 1921, there was a head-on collision on a single line between two passenger trains, which resulted in the death of 17 people and serious injuries to 36 others. This disaster occurred because of a chain of errors, misunderstandings and non-compliance with the rules by station staff and train crew. There are clear parallels with the events leading up to the incident at Romney Sands.
More detail on that incident can be found here.
It would seem that some elements of the rail network haven’t made much advancement in the past 98 years, which will be a great concern to passengers using these services. Structuring the scheduling of such services can be done easily – and flexibly – via modern software solutions, which enhance the work of stationmasters and provide a clear overview of which trains are running and where.
MODERN TECHNOLOGY CAN HELP
Deploying technology in the process provides schedulers with a single source of truth and an easy means of communicating schedule changes to drivers and stationmasters. Schedulers would be able to approve a train to use a single section of track, with the backup of technology to highlight potential conflict and the further input of the stationmaster on ground. The incident at Romney Sands arose, in part, out of confusion emanating from a change to the timetable which was affected at late notice in order to minimise the impact on the network of an earlier late running train.
Such instructions can be easily handled with technology but can lead to confusion in wholly manual processes and, in this case, severe danger. The technology is available to transport networks now. There is no need to keep on repeating mistakes from the 1920s.